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EXPEDITING COURT PROCEDURE
By Geo. F. Dunklee, Presiding Judge District Court, at
Luncheon of the Denver Bar Association, January 9, 1933
Honorable Judges and Members of the Denver Bar:

I

APPRECIATE that it has not heretofore been customary
for a retiring presiding judge of this court to make a
report, or make suggestions or recommendations concerning the procedure or business of the court to the bench
or bar.
However, it may not be out of place. I am confirmed in
that opinion because the law singles out the judges of the
Supreme and District Courts from all other persons in Sec.
7165, C. L. 1921, which is as follows:
"It shall be and is hereby declared to be the duty of the judges of the supreme
and district courts, to make a special report to the legislature, at each session thereof,
of all such defects, omissions or imperfections in this code, as experience may suggest."

When I hear of laymen, that have never given any special study to the subject, advocating sweeping changes in our
constitution, civil code of procedure and laws, without the
advice of competent counsel, I think that perhaps said judges
have been derelict in the performance of that duty.
However that may be, I make the following recommendations which I deem pertinent to the occasion, based upon
my experience as an attorney at law, judge and presiding
judge of this court.
I.
In the April, 1932, issue of "Dicta" there is an article
entitled "Speeding Up Justice" (p. 158), followed by a report of a committee on the subject (p. 167), which has been
considered by the court en banc.
Sections 5718 to 5720, C. L. 1921, provide, in substance,
that a judicial district of the district court having more than
one judge, each judge shall exercise all of the powers and
functions of his court, and, therefore, each judge can and does
conduct his court in his own way, and will continue to do so
unless the court en banc, or the judges by common consent,
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should deem it advisable to adopt some rules or practice on
the particular subjects hereinafter mentioned in order to make
it more uniform and better understood for the benefit of court
and counsel.
II.
The new municipal building, the court rooms of which
we formally dedicate tomorrow-the first day of the January, 1933, term of court-when Hon. Charles C. Sackmann
takes office as presiding judge-is situated three and a half
blocks from the old court house-over a quarter of a mile
one way and over half mile round trip, taking more than
fifteen minutes extra time as usually walked to and from
court, or about a half hour's walk each way from the downtown law office district.
The foregoing is of sufficient importance to cause us to
pause and consider if some system or practice of the court
cannot be adopted that will save attorneys and clients from
making any unnecessary and useless trips to and from court.
III.
This seems particularly fitting when we consider that the
courts were established by the people, and for the benefit of
the people, in which to transact their legal business. Consider that a trip takes about, if not quite, a half day's time of
a lawyer, and a day for his client and witnesses every time he
or they come to court and are simply told by the judge when
they can come again. The ordinary run of cases does not involve sufficient to stand the expense caused by delay and
unnecessary trips to court.'

IV.
REVENUE OF CLERK'S OFFICE

Previous to the act concerning the taxing of fees, S. L.
1923, p. 249, whereby a flat docket fee of $7.50 or $12.50
was fixed, according to the kind of an action, as a total cost
for the plaintiff to pay for trial in each case filed, and a fee of
$5.00 for the appearance of the defendant, the revenue of the
clerk's office was derived from a multitude rf small fees from
"5 cents to $1.50," for each paper filed or order entered as
per Sec. 7878, C. L. 1921.
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V.
JUDGE SWEARS WITNESSES

Among other things, a fee was established to be taxed as
clerk's costs for each witness sworn by him, but there was no
provision for taxing any costs if the judge performed that
duty. Consequently, it was customary for revenue purposes
for the clerk's office to have the clerk of the division swear the
witnesses instead of the judge.
In view of the change of the fee system by said law of
1923, in my opinion it is better for the trial judge to swear
the witnesses during the trial of a case, and thereby relieve the
division clerk from any unnecessary interruption in the performance of his duties. I have in mind that the division clerk
has a great deal of work to do in taking and writing up his
orders, answering inquiries of attorneys on the telephone, or
otherwise, and notifying them when their cases will be
reached, and other matters that accommodate counsel, and
count for efficiency in handling of the docket and business of
the court.
VI.
MATTERS OF COURSE

In my judgment matters of course, defaults, noncontested divorce cases, alimony hearings and all such matters of
course, should come up for hearing and disposition at 9:30
A. M., without any previous notice or setting of the same of
record by the court, and heard before taking up the trial of
cases. Such a practice saves the time of court and counsel,
and "speeds up justice." Where such a practice prevails
daily, it seldom, if ever, runs past 10:00 A. M., and as a rule
not to exceed fifteen minutes.
VII.
UNNECESSARY ORDERS

Under the old fee system quite a number of unnecessary
acts or orders were made for extra revenue for the clerk's
office. In my opinion all such orders should be done away
with, as they simply tend to make unnecessary work for the
clerk's office-such orders as continuing all cases on the docket
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from day to day, striking a case from the trial docket, except
on request of an attorney, which nceessitates another notice
and a re-setting of the case, instead of carrying the same on
the docket and taking it up for trial when the parties are
ready.
For instance, where a divorce case comes on for trial as
noncontested, the custom of an attorney for one of the parties asking for an order withdrawing an answer, a cross bill
or a complaint, before the case is set for trial as a noncontested case, serves no useful or legal purpose. Every such
order requires four operations: first, a division clerk makes
an entry on his pad; second, writes it up on his minute sheet;
third, a clerk in the main office writes it in the registry of
actions, and, fourth, a clerk types it in the permanent book.
If the issues are made up, or it is noncontested of record,
and one of the parties does not desire to contest the case, the
attorney for such party can so state in open court, and it can
be set for trial and the case proceeds at once as a noncontested
case, which legally adjudicates the matter for all purposes
just as effectively as though the foregoing extra orders were
asked and granted. There is no more legal reason for making
those orders in a noncontested divorce case than there would
be in any other case that comes on for trial before the court
where a party does not wish to prosecute or defend, and so
states for the record.
VIII.
SETTING OF CASES

All cases regularly noticed for trial, either to the court or
jury, should be set on the first day of the term, unless special
setting is made, and all other cases should stand on the docket
as set for the first day, and be given special settings from time
to time as requested to suit the convenience of both court and
counsel.
The advantage of the foregoing system is that the clerk
who keeps the docket has all of the cases before him, and in
case some that were especially set are settled, or, for some reason, cannot be tried, many times can immediately get in touch
with attorneys who can get ready for trial.
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Ix.
UNTRIED CASES STAND ON DOCKET
In my opinion, a case once regularly set on the trial

docket should remain there, and not be stricken therefrom,
except by request of counsel. If the case is not tried on the
date set, as has been stated, it can be carried on the trial
docket as originally set, until some time convenient to court
and counsel, when it can be tried. The division clerk can
usually conveniently arrange this matter over the 'phone, or
otherwise, by agreement of counsel without coming to court
in person. If the attorneys cannot agree, the matter can be
regularly heard and decided by the court.

X.
AVOIDS DELAY

Where such system does not prevail it frequently happens that the court gets behind with its docket, notwithstanding some of the time it cannot find a case ready for trial,
first, due to a case specially set and being at the last moment,
just before trial, settled or dismissed, and, second, other cases
set for a particular day cannot be called; whereas, some cases
could have been taken up and tried or disposed of, if some of
them had been left standing on the docket as set on the first
day of the term, and counsel kept in touch with the clerk over
the 'phone, thus enabling the court to keep up with the board
and not get behind.
Experience shows that cases settled are many times not
actually settled until they are reached on the docket and the
court is ready to start the trial.

XI.
AT CHAMBERS

Sec. 472 of the Code, C. L. 1921, provides:
"Duty and powers 'of judge at chambers.-Sec. 29. The judges of courts of
record shall, at all reasonable times, when not engaged in holding courts, transact such
business at their chambers as may be done out of court. At chambers they may hear
and dispose of all applications for orders and writs which are usually granted in the
first instance upon ex parte application, and may, in their discretion, also hear applications to discharge such orders and writs."
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You will note that this section provides that the "judges
when not holding courts" may "transact such business as
may be done out of court."
For the better administration of justice it follows, in the
interest of public policy, that when a judge is "holding
court," his judicial duties should be performed in open court,
in the regular court room, open to the public, where the court
reporter and clerk are in their places to take down and record
XII.
the proceedings.
MAKING UP ISSUES

The greatest delay in the trial of cases occurs, in my
opinion, in making up the issues. The filing of various motions to quash service of summons, to strike parts of complaint, answer or replication, and a motion to make them
more specific and certain, and finally a demurrer to some or
all of said pleadings takes much time and prolongs the reaching of the case for trial on the merits if the court sets such
matters for hearing several weeks ahead on the docket after
notice has been served and a setting asked for a day for
hearing.
I do not in any way desire to discourage the filing of any
or all of said motions or demurrers as the attorneys elect, but,
in my opinion, they should all be set for hearing on the next
hearing day after the filing of the notice, unless for some
reason attorneys request a later date.
Experience shows that generally on calling the docket,
several of such matters will be withdrawn before argument,
others will be submitted without argument, and a number
will have to be continued to accommodate counsel for one
reason or another, with the result that not more than eight
come up for actual hearing, and some of them not taking
more than five or ten minutes of the time of the court. Unless this system prevails, frequently the docket gets blocked,
and much of the time of the court is idle.
XIII.
Ex PARTE RESTRAINING ORDERS

Divorce Cases
Sec. 5721, C. L. 1921, and Rule I of the Rules of the
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District Court, define the office and powers of the presiding
judge. Sec. 5 of the rules provides, among other things, "The
presiding judge shall act on all matters before cases have been
assigned."
In the May, 1932, issue of "Dicta" on page 190 there is
an opinion by me as presiding judge on ex parte orders in
divorce proceedings.
In the case of Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164, the
question was before the Supreme Court. Paragraph 1 of the
syllabus states:
"1. INJUNCTION-PRELIMINARY-OBTAINED BY FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OR PRACTICE AS TO EMERGENCY.-Nothing in the provisions
of the code requires the discontinuance of an action, on account of the wrongful procuring of a preliminary restraining order, unless the opposing party moves to have the
case dismissed on said account."

The questions as to whether or not the code provisions
on injunction, or as to whether the district court possesses
inherent common-law power to issue restraining orders without notice and without bond, was not decided for the aforesaid reason.
On page 168 the court says:
"This is not to be construed as implying that the code provision on injunction is
applicable to divorce actions. Whether the district court possesses inherent comon-law
power to issue restraining orders in proper cases, in divorce actions, without notice and
without bond, we express no opinion."

As presiding judge, before whom the applications for
practically all of these drastic orders are heard, after reviewing
the authorities, I decided that, as a matter of law, the court
possesses no such arbitrary power, and that certain provisions
of our code of civil procedure (Secs. 165, 167) concerning
notice (406-407) and contempt (Sec. 365) of court do apply to divorce proceedings, and other sections of the code that
are not in conflict with the statutes concerning divorce and
alimony (Secs. 5593 to 5609, C. L. 1921, and amendments
thereto). It should be borne in mind that these arbitrary
orders are not asked in cases except where the husband and
wife are actually living together at the time of the filing of
the complaint for divorce and make the ex parte application
without notice.
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The last section of our civil code, 479, C. L. 1921, says:
"The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed, has no application, to this code. Its provisions, and all proceedings
under it, shall be liberally construed, with a view to promote its object and assist the
parties in obtaining justice."

From practical experience, and the records of the clerk's
office, the way the custom works out in the courts is that the
husband being summarily, without notice, barred from his
own home by an ex parte order of the court, where he has
been living with his wife and family, leaves the wife to take
the divorce by default and the property by some settlement.
A previous notice before the drastic order would have given
the husband and wife an opportunity for reconciliation.
It is the unfair advantage that the practice of granting
these ex parte orders without notice has upon the marriage
relation and the orderly proceedings of the court that I stress
this point.
It should be borne in mind that the interest of the complaining wife, as she sees it when applying ex parte, is not
the only one to be considered in the granting of such ex parte
orders, but the interest of the state and minor children. A
case has never come to my knowledge where a husband was
living in his home with his family, and she, ex parte, obtained
one of these drastic orders, became reconciled.
The above fact is one reason why so many of them have
been applied for in the past.
People ex rel. v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186.
XIV.
CASES NOT JUGGLED

The practice, that has sometimes prevailed in the past, of
juggling cases from division to division and from judge to
judge, either when assigned or by request of an attorney, or
by dismissing without prejudice of a case and refiling the
same, when it appears to the court that the object was to get
that particular case before a particular judge, or to avoid a
certain judge, for one reason or another, has been stopped by
amendment of Rule II, requiring all cases to be assigned to
divisions in open court, and by certain decisions and opinions
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of record in certain cases where the question has been raised
and passed upon by the court.
The reason for stopping that practice was that it was
demoralizing to the legal profession and the administration
of justice.
There is usually behind such action an ulterior motive to
prevent justice.
Our judges are not timid, but have the courage of their
convictions; and if any lawyer or his client has any charges
to make or reasons why a certain judge should not try a case,
let him face the facts, file his motion, supported by affidavit
as evidence of his good faith, as was done in the case of People
v. District Court, 84 Colo. 367.
I think I speak for all the judges of the District Court
when I say that a loose practice on this question will not be
tolerated in the future.
Colin A. Smith, formerly attorney for the Public Utilities Commission for Denver, Colorado, has entered private
practice.
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